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1 Introduction
An ageing population bears important consequences for labour markets. Policy mak-
ers and an increasing number of individual organisations as well as private ﬁrms
realise that early retirement of older employees deprives companies of valuable ex-
pertise and creates a shortage of qualiﬁed employees. Thus, the trend towards early
retirement policies starts being reversed.
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that in many countries older workers
continue to confront unfavourable labour market conditions compared to other age
groups. Despite the increasing need for working life extension as well as the age
diversity enabling the transmission of skills and know-how, the employment and hire
rates of older workers stay at a very low level in many developed countries. Employ-
ers' negative perceptions about the adaptability and productivity of older employees
are among the reasons. An increase in the workforce's average age is frequently
associated with higher labour costs as well as greater resistance to technological de-
velopments and only rarely with an expected increase in productivity (Remery et al.,
2003). Although employers appreciate older employees' experience, loyalty and low
turnover, nevertheless younger workers are preferred when it comes to actual hiring
decisions (Guest and Shacklock, 2005).
Actually, the distribution of productivity across the age groups is not a priori de-
termined. It can be higher for older workers due to longer experience acquired and
higher level of job speciﬁc knowledge. On the other hand, the older workers' eﬃ-
ciency might become deteriorated as a result of the structural changes in the labour
market, e.g. accelerating technological progress and less training oﬀered (Daveri and
Maliranta, 2006; Maurer, 2001). Interestingly, age-productivity proﬁle might diﬀer
between occupations. Older employees can remain highly productive in the domain
that they know well and where relatively long experience is important. Thanks
to tacit knowledge, older managers may perform as well as younger ones (Colonia-
Willner, 1998). On the other hand, reduction in productivity of seniors appears to
be the strongest in jobs where speed, spatial orientation and learning new materials
are important (Skirbekk, 2003).
In particular, the situation of older workers on the labour market may be undermined
when aging drives a negative wedge between the workers' productivity and earnings.
The increasing age-earnings pattern characterised by lower wages for young workers
and higher wages for older workers is widely observed (Loewenstein and Sicherman,
1991). This fact combined with doubts about the true productivity of older workers
raises an important question on the relations between productivity and earnings
across the age groups. There exists some empirical evidence against the paradigm
of wage and marginal productivity equality. Frank (1984) as well as Campbell and
Kamlani (1997) have found that wage rates vary substantially less than do individual
productivity values. Even if a wide discrepancy in productivity among individual
workers exists, many ﬁrms continue to follow strict remuneration scheme based on
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education, experience and tenure length. As a result of rigid remuneration system,
in response to a negative productivity shock, employers instead of adjusting wages,
adjust their employment structure. Consequently, the least productive workers are
the ﬁrst to become redundant. Likewise, the employment opportunities of workers
whose wages exceed their productivity levels become reduced.
The present study aims at evaluating the actual proﬁle of marginal productivity
across the age classes within the workforce. The comparison to proﬁle of earnings let
us analyse the relative productivity and test whether diﬀerences in wage shares across
groups of workers are justiﬁed by proportional productivity contribution. Since,
as mentioned above, age-productivity proﬁle might diﬀer between occupations, the
workforce has been diﬀerentiated not only by age (young, middle-aged, old), but also
by skills (low-skilled, high-skilled). The simultaneous diﬀerentiation by age and by
skills is of high interest in the perspective of possible dissimilarities among diﬀerent
categories of workers with respect to the sensitivity to work eﬀort incentives, training
oﬀered, etc.
Although there is a growing research interest in the relation between age and pro-
ductivity, the empirical analyses so far have often been focused on the estimation
of Cobb-Douglas production functions speciﬁcation in capital and labour. The ﬁrm-
level labour productivity itself was treated as a simple summation of productivities of
individual workers (Hellerstein et al., 1999; Crépon et al., 2002; Aubert and Crépon,
2003). Thus, the existing studies are characterised by a limitation of perfect sub-
stitutability between diﬀerent categories of workers. In this study, we refer to the
production function estimation as well. However, in contrast to the previous studies,
the use of the less restrictive, constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functional
form is proposed at the level of labour input. This more general form, thanks to
smaller number of constraints imposed on the production technology, allows the
imperfect substitution between diﬀerent categories of workers. The potential cor-
relation between inputs and productivity has been controlled for according to the
method by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
The dataset used in this study (DADS-BRN) covers the French manufacturing, ser-
vices and trade sectors. French data are particularly interesting in the perspective
of our study. Actually, among all OECD countries, France is characterised by the
highest employment rate of people aged 25-54 (83 % in 2008) and at the same time
one of the lowest employment rate of people over 55 (38 % in 2008). In fact, workers
over 50 are often touched by long-term unemployment. In particular, the low-skilled
workers face problems to stay employed and once unemployed, they hardly ﬁnd a
new job.
A diﬀerentiation of workforce simultaneously by age and skills let us observe the
diﬀerences in the age-productivity and age-earnings proﬁles separately within each
skill group. We ﬁnd that this diﬀerentiation is, in fact, very important. The observed
productivity proﬁle across diﬀerent age groups seems actually depending on the skill
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level. Among the main ﬁndings of this study, labour productivity is found to be
the lowest for the oldest low-skilled workers. In the high-skilled labour category,
in manufacturing, the mean productivity stays quite stable across the age groups,
being the highest for the workers over 50. In trade, the high-skilled oldest employees
are clearly the most productive group. As far as age-earnings pattern is concerned,
we observe a very similar pattern throughout the sectors. The wage rates vary
considerably less than productivity in both skill groups. The wage proﬁle is however
steeper for the high-skilled workers.
The results for manufacturing sector show that the age-productivity and age-earnings
proﬁles are compatible with a deferred compensation system. It might indicate
that the eﬀort incentive problem has been regulated in practice by many ﬁrms by
oﬀering at the start of the career wages under the workers' marginal productivity and
compensating this diﬀerence in the later periods. On the other hand, in services and
in trade, we observe the combined relevance of speciﬁc human capital and deferred
compensation.
Though, the most interesting aspect is the workers' productivity in relation to their
cost. It is particularly important as for the employers it may present an incentive
to exclude some age groups from the labour market and to give preference to the
others. In our study, the relative productivity over cost in manufacturing sector has
been found to represent a similar pattern in both skill groups, being the highest for
the young, followed by middle-aged and old workers. In both skill groups in services
and for low-skilled trade employees the productivity/earnings ratio is the highest for
the middle-aged, followed by young and senior workers. This discrepancy between
productivity and wage can be a source of employment diﬃculties particularly for
the older low-skilled workers. If prolongation of a working life is one of the political
priorities, this fact should be taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing
theoretical literature as well as empirical evidence on the relation between age, wage
and productivity. Section 3 shows the model. In the fourth part an econometric
estimation method is presented. The dataset used in this study has been described in
part 5. The estimation results are analysed in section 6, followed by the conclusions.
2 Age, wage and productivity: literature review
2.1 Theoretical background
From an employer's perspective, the actual distribution of productivity and earnings
across diﬀerent age groups of the current workforce is very important. While deciding
on the production level, a ﬁrm has to choose the optimal level of labour input needed
to generate the given output. From the economic point of view, there is an incentive
to ﬁnd the age mix of the workforce that can produce a given output at the least
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cost. This will be the age mix that yields the highest labour productivity and is
described as the optimal age mix of the ﬁrm's workforce (Guest and Shacklock,
2005). Although the ﬁrst aspect, dispersion of earnings, is usually easy to verify,
there exists still large uncertainties regarding the productivity distribution across
age categories.
Over the 70s and 80s, the relationship between workers' age, wage rates and their
productivity has attracted the attention of many researchers. Observations of wage
tending to grow with worker's seniority in the ﬁrm brought questions on the link be-
tween this phenomenon and the evolution of worker's productivity. There exist two
important approaches that predict a possible relation between age, wage and produc-
tivity: 1) human capital theory suggesting that wage proﬁles are either equivalent to
or ﬂatter than productivity growth over the life cycle and 2) deferred compensation
models justifying the need for a wage proﬁle steeper than productivity.
An explanation yielded by human capital theory is based on the idea that wages
increase over time due to investments in human capital, particularly investments in
the job training (Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1975). Older workers are therefore paid more
since they have accumulated more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and thus they are
more productive. The general human capital theory is founded on the assumption
that at any point in time workers' wage indicates their productivity. Wages rise
over the life cycle at a decreasing rate until depreciation exceeds the level of skill
acquisition, yielding a concave earnings proﬁle. According to speciﬁc human capital
theory, the ﬁrm and the worker are assumed to share the investment in worker's
training during an initial period. While being trained, workers receive a wage that
is lower than wages oﬀered otherwise. Thanks to training, workers become more
productive and in later periods gain the returns from the investment through higher
marginal products and higher wages. In this case, the resulting wage proﬁles will be
ﬂatter than the productivity path (Hashimoto, 1981).
On the other hand, deferred compensation models underline the possibility of in-
centive based compensation schemes. A good example of such model is the agency
model by Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979, 1981). In order to discourage
workers' shirking, the ﬁrm pays young workers below their marginal productivity and
later in their career remunerates them over their marginal product. Senior workers
receive high salaries, not due to relatively higher productivity but because it creates
the appropriate wage incentives for them and for their younger co-workers (Lazear
(1981)). Consequently, a steeper wage proﬁle increases workers' eﬀort. In particu-
lar, the young workers who hope to stay in the ﬁrm are induced to perform at the
optimal level. The eﬃciency wage models (Yellen, 1984; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984;
Bulow and Summers, 1986) point out the importance of the payment above market
clearing wages as a mechanism to elicit more eﬀort from the worker when it cannot
be fully observable. The fact that wages do not reﬂect the actual productivity but
increase with seniority may result in raised employment diﬃculties for older workers.
Indeed, the deferred compensation contracts may constitute a form of ﬁxed costs for
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the employer. We observe that for certain jobs many ﬁrms employ, but tend not to
hire older workers (Hutchens, 1986).
According to the arguments mentioned above, it takes time for workers to accumulate
education, experience and skill through learning-by-doing. Thus, older workers seem
to be more productive than younger ones. However, searching for an optimal age
composition of a given workforce, one should not forget that younger cohorts of
workers today have much higher education levels than their predecessors. Moreover,
within the given enterprise, workers of diﬀerent age might be less than perfectly
substitutable as it is usually assumed. Hence, the optimum age composition of a
given workforce might in fact depend on two elements: relative marginal productivity
and the degree of substitutability between workers of diﬀerent age (Lam, 1989).
2.2 Empirical evidence
As far as empirical works are concerned, there is relatively little research aiming
at productivity and wage data comparison and their correlation with workers' age.
Among the recent studies, the contribution of Hellerstein et al. (1999) is worth being
mentioned. Using a cross-section plant-level matched employer-employee dataset, the
authors analysed the relationship between productivity and wage diﬀerentials among
manufacturing workers distinguished by diﬀerent demographic characteristics such
as gender, race, marital status, age, education and occupation. In this purpose, a
translog production function was jointly estimated with earnings equation. Diﬀerent
categories of workers were assumed to be perfectly substitutable but have potentially
diﬀerent marginal products. The condition of perfectly competitive market was
not imposed. The authors allowed possible inequality between relative marginal
productivity and relative wage for diﬀerent workers groups, which could be then
interpreted as an indicator of a long-term incentive contracts or discrimination. As
a result of their analysis, the authors claimed that in fact wage diﬀerentials reﬂect
actual diﬀerences in marginal products for most types of workers, particularly for the
age category. Consequently, and as underlined by authors, this ﬁnding is coherent
with the general human capital model by Mincer (1974) mentioned above.
Contrary results have been obtained by Crépon et al. (2002) who expanded the
approach by Hellerstein et al. Using the French matched employer-employee panel
data set they estimated the Cobb-Douglas production function. The assumption of
perfect substitutability between diﬀerent types of workers was also made. However,
instead of parallel estimation of production function and earnings equation as had
done Hellerstein et al., only one equation was estimated here. The authors made
use of disaggregated data on wages that had been not available to Hellerstein et
al. The production function was modiﬁed in a way to contain directly a ratio of
hourly productivity to wage for diﬀerent workers categories. Among the ﬁndings,
the authors stated the existence of a wage productivity gap which tends to expand
with age. The wages continue to increase with workers' age whereas the productivity
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stops rising at one point or even declines. It is though unclear whether the old
workers are overpaid or the young ones underpaid, or if these both events take place.
However, the authors pointed out that increase in wages for workers over 35 cannot
be interpreted as reﬂecting human capital accumulation.
Expanding on the previous methodologies, Aubert and Crépon (2003) made use
of the French panel data decomposing the labour force into thinner age groups.
Through the estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function, they found that
productivity tends to grow with age up to age of 40 and stabilise afterwards. In all
the sectors, workers aged 35-39 appear to be slightly less productive than those over
40 and around 15 to 20 % more productive than young workers under 30 years old.
At the same time, the authors found no evidence of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
wage and productivity that could explain the lower employability of older workers.
Although for workers older than 55 a slight decrease in productivity is observed, this
result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Again, quite diﬀerent results have been obtained by Hellerstein and Neumark (2006)
who refer to their previous article (Hellerstein et al., 1999). They used the same
speciﬁcations and sample selection criteria but used larger and more representative
dataset. The estimated age proﬁles suggest that the most productive group are
prime-age workers (35-54), followed by the younger ones and the seniors (over 55) as
the least productive. Furthermore, the wage proﬁle steeper than productivity proﬁle
is consistent with the deferred compensation model à la Lazear. Finally, the authors
strongly rejected the hypothesis of productivity and wage diﬀerentials equality.
Overall, it is evident from this literature review that no clear conclusion can be drawn
from earlier research. The current paper continues to investigate the productivity
and wage relationship across diﬀerent age categories of labour trying to overcome one
common limitation of previous studies. In our analysis, we introduce the possibility
of imperfect substitutability between diﬀerent categories of workers. In previous
empirical works, regardless of the choice of the production function speciﬁcation in
labour and capital (Cobb-Douglas or translog), diﬀerent workers types were simply
summed up according to the assumption of perfect substitutability.
3 The model: production function with labour as nested
CES
The assumption of perfect substitutability between workers with diﬀerent charac-
teristics implies that employing one worker while dismissing another one will not
lead to any change in the marginal products of either of them as one is perfectly
substitutable for another. However, it has been noticed that actually there might
arise an interaction of workers within a ﬁrm (Lengermann, 2002). The productiv-
ity of a certain employee might be aﬀected by co-worker's characteristics. It might
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matter whether the employee works together with a colleague with the same level of
skills, similar age, etc. In particular, there exists empirical evidence that the human
capitals of young and older workers are imperfect substitutes (Kremer and Thom-
son, 1998). Hence, labour is not necessarily as easily substitutable as it seems at
ﬁrst glance. This study tries to overcome this problem by choosing such a form of
the production function that would take into account the potential imperfect substi-
tutability inside of the workforce - between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and
between diﬀerent age categories within each skill group. In this purpose, we esti-
mate the Cobb-Douglas production function speciﬁcation in capital (K) and labour
(L) whereas the labour input itself takes a form of the nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) function.
Since Arrow et al. (1961) have formulated the function of type CES, numerous studies
have been pursued in order to estimate its parameters. However, none of them has
been used so far in the context of the labour productivity analysis. As mentioned
before, most of research on age-productivity pattern has been based so far on the
estimation of the production function. However, by imposing the additive functional
form for diﬀerent categories of labour inputs, they implied a perfect substitution
between them.
Figure 1: Scheme of the production structure
Y
CD:                   1 klU
      K                            L 
              
CES:                                          sU
                                               lL hL
CES:               lU                                                                                                 hU
                           lyL lmL loL hyL hmL hoL
Our benchmark (see Figure 1) takes into account two skill groups (low-skilled (Ll)
and high-skilled (Lh)) and within each skill category - three age groups of workers
(young (Ly), middle-aged (Lm), old (Lo)). The labour input is allowed to be het-
erogeneous across but homogeneous within closely deﬁned groups of workers. Thus,
it is assumed that the employees belonging to the same skill-age group (e.g. young
low-skilled) are perfectly substitutable.
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At the highest level, our production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form given
by:
Y = f (K,L) = AKαLβ
where K denotes capital, L stands for labour and A is a Hicks neutral technological
progress.
At the second level the labour aggregate is deﬁned as a CES function of high-skilled
and low-skilled workers:
L =
(∑
i
δiL
ρi
i
) 1
ρi
(1)
where i indicates the skill category. Finally, each skill group of workers is a CES
function by itself:
Li =
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij
 1ρij (2)
where the age category is denoted by j .
Based on this choice of production function, we aim at estimating the distribution
parameters: δi, δij as well as the substitution parameters: ρi and ρij . The elasticity
of substitution is deﬁned as σ = d ln(x1/x2)
d ln
(
∂Y
∂x1/
∂Y
∂x2
) and is a measure of the percentage
change in factors demand due to a percentage change in the marginal rate of technical
substitution so that the output remains constant. For the case of constant returns
to scale it takes the form: σ = 11−ρ . The inverse of sigma
(
1
σ
)
denotes a change in
the marginal rate of technical substitution due to a change in factor proportions so
that the output remains constant.
Productivity contribution
Given the estimates of the production function parameters, we compute the labour
marginal product for diﬀerent categories of labour. In this setting, the constant
returns to scale are assumed at the level of labour inputs. According to the Euler's
theorem, under homogeneity of degree 1, the labour function might be represented
as a sum of its inputs multiplied by their marginal products:
f(L1, L2, ..., Ln) = L1
∂f
∂L1
+ L2
∂f
∂L2
+ ...+ Ln
∂f
∂Ln
(3)
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Therefore, we can deﬁne the marginal product of labour as labour input contribution
to the ﬁrm-level production.
Skill diﬀerentiation
For the given skill group, it takes the following form:
MPi =
∂Y
∂L
∂L
∂Li
(4)
MPi = AKαβ
(∑
i
δiL
ρi
i
) β
ρi
−1
δiL
ρi−1
i (5)
The marginal rate of technical substitution depends not only on the factor intensity
and the distribution parameter but also on the level of substitution between diﬀerent
labour categories. It shows the rate at which one input may be substituted for
another, while maintaining the same level of production. The relative marginal
product of labour for workers diﬀerentiated by skills is given by:
MP1
MP2
=
∂L/∂L1
∂L/∂L2
= λ =
δ1
δ2
(
L1
L2
)ρi−1
(6)
In order to compare productivity contribution over diﬀerent skill categories, we com-
pute for each enterprise a ratio of marginal product of workers belonging to certain
skill group in relation to the average marginal product of labour. For two categories
of skills, the ratios take the following form:
MP1
MPav
=
L
L1 + λ−1L2
and
MP2
MPav
=
L
λL1 + L2
where MPav is the average marginal product of total labour.
Age diﬀerentiation
The marginal product of labour for a given age group in a speciﬁed skill category is
deﬁned as:
MPij =
∂Y
∂L
∂L
∂Li
∂Li
∂Lij
(7)
MPi = AKαβ
(∑
i
δiL
ρi
i
) β
ρi
−1
δiL
ρi
ρj
−1
i δijL
ρij−1
ij (8)
The relative marginal product of any two age groups of workers in a given skill group
is:
MPi1
MPi2
=
δi1
δi2
(
Li1
Li2
)ρij−1
(9)
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In our setting, we deﬁne relative marginal products as: MPiYMPiM = ϕ,
MPiY
MPiO
= γ
and MPiMMPiO = η (where Y - young, M - middle-aged, O - old). The productivity
contribution of each age group is given by the ratio of marginal product of respective
age group over the average labour marginal productivity of a speciﬁc skill group:
MPiY
MPav
=
Li
LiY + ϕ−1LiM + γ−1LiO
(10)
MPiM
MPav
=
Li
ϕLiY + LiM + η−1LiO
(11)
MPiO
MPav
=
Li
γLiY + ηLiM + LiO
(12)
Wage share
Our dataset contains rich information on earnings. Hence, according to the procedure
above, we compute the share of a distinct age group in the wage bill of the given
skill category. Given the productivity contributions and the analogously constructed
wage shares, we can compare an earnings-productivity pattern for diﬀerent categories
of workers.
4 The method
As far as the econometric estimation of the production function is concerned, one
of the major problems to confront is the possible endogeneity of inputs resulting in
inconsistency of direct estimators. In fact, the input demand might be correlated
with the productivity shocks unobservable by the econometrician but observed or
predicted by the ﬁrm (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). A proﬁt maximizing (or cost-
minimizing) ﬁrm facing positive productivity shocks will expand its production and
thus increase the inputs level. On the other hand, a consequence of the negative
shocks will be a production decrease and lower input usage. A particular concern
about the endogeneity bias concerns the analysis of labour disaggregated by age.
Aubert and Crépon (2003) draw attention to the fact that enterprise could respond
to negative productivity shocks by postponing its hiring decisions. Then, one might
observe production decline accompanied by ageing workforce. On the other hand,
positive shocks could encourage the ﬁrm to hire some young workers. As a result,
the rise in output would be generated by relatively younger workforce. The causality
problem that appears in such case is whether ﬁrms employing relatively older work-
force are less productive or if ﬁrms employ relatively older workforce because they
are less productive.
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In order to obtain consistent estimates of the production function parameters, we use
the method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The procedure consists in
including in the estimation equation a proxy for the productivity shocks potentially
observed by ﬁrms while making input decisions1. Hence, the parameters identiﬁca-
tion is based on the variation in output and inputs unrelated to these productivity
shocks.
We consider the following value added production function:
yit = β0 + αkit + βln

∑
i
δi
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij it

ρi
ρij

1
ρi
+ ωit + ηit (13)
The error term is composed of 2 elements: ωit denoting productivity shocks likely
observed by the ﬁrm and ηit having no impact on the ﬁrm's inputs decisions. yit is
a natural logarithm of value added and kit denotes a natural logarithm of capital.
Following LP, we assume that ﬁrms decide on the level of capital at t − 1, thus
capital is a dynamic input. The labour and the intermediate input (materials) mit
are chosen at time t . The productivity shock ωit is assumed to follow a ﬁrst order
Markov process:
p(ωit|Iit−1) = p(ωit|ωit−1) (14)
where I is ﬁrm's i's information set at t.
The approach adopted in the current work consists in using intermediate input as
a proxy for the unobservable productivity shocks. Hence, materials control for the
part of the error term correlated with inputs. Given the above timing assumptions,
the ﬁrm's demand for the intermediate input mit is assumed to depend on the state
variables kit and ωit.
mit = ft(kit, ωit) (15)
The assumption that intermediate input is strictly monotonic in the productivity
shock allows inversion of materials demand function for ωit
ωit = f−1t (kit,mit) (16)
and substituting it into the production function so that the following ﬁrst stage
equation is obtained:
1An alternative approach toward endogeneity bias has been developed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and consisted in estimating an equation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences with appropriately lagged levels as
instruments. However, since lagged variables in levels are often weak instruments for contemporane-
ous diﬀerences, in case of highly persistent data, the method appeared to suﬀer from ﬁnite sample
bias and poor precision of the estimates. This problem has been further addressed by Blundell
and Bond (1998), Blundell and Bond (2000), Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) and Wind-
meijer (2000). Within this framework lagged levels are used as instruments for contemporaneous
diﬀerences and lagged diﬀerences as instruments for contemporaneous levels.
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yit = βln

∑
i
δi
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij it

ρi
ρij

1
ρi
+ φit(kit,mit) + ηit (17)
where φit(kit,mit) = β0 + αkit + ωit(kit,mit).
By substituting the third-order polynomial in kit and mit, in place of φit(kit,mit):
yit = δ0 + βln

∑
i
δi
∑
j
δijL
ρij
ij it

ρi
ρij

1
ρi
 3+∑
j=0
3−j∑
n=0
δjnk
j
itm
n
it + ηit (18)
we can consistently estimate parameters for labour using the non-linear least squares
method. In this setting, β0 is not separately identiﬁed from the intercept of the
polynomial δ0.
The second stage of the procedure helps us to identify the coeﬃcient for capital. It
starts with computing the estimated value of φˆit:
φˆit = yˆit − βˆln

∑
i
δˆi
∑
j
δˆijL
ρˆij
ij it

ρˆi
ρˆij

1
ρˆi
 = δˆ0 +
3∑
j=0
3−j∑
n=0
δˆjnk
j
itm
n
it (19)
For any candidate value α∗, we can compute the prediction for ωit for all periods t:
ωˆit = φˆit − α∗kit (20)
Given these values, we regress non-parametrically ωit on its lagged term ωit−1:
ωˆit = γ0 + γ1ωit−1 + γ2ω2it−1 + γ3ω
3
it−1 + it (21)
in order to get the residual ξit and the conditional expectation E [ωit | ωit−1] =
ωit − ξit.
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Given labour coeﬃcients, a guess value α∗and E [ωit | ωit−1], we can ﬁnd a consistent
estimate of a parameter for capital which is a solution to minimizing a squared sum
of a sample residual of our production function:
min
α∗
∑
t
(ηit+ξit)
2=min
α∗
∑
t
yit−βˆln

∑
i
δˆi
(∑
j
δˆijL
ρˆij
ij it
) ρˆi
ρˆij

1
ρˆi
−α∗kit−E[ωit|ωit−1]

2
(22)
The asymptotic standard errors for estimated parameters might be constructed using
a bootstrap approach.
5 Data and summary statistics
The dataset used in this study covers a short panel of data for years 2003 and 2004
for manufacturing, services and trade sectors in France. It comes from merging two
diﬀerent data sources: Bénéﬁces Réels Normaux (BRN) and Déclarations Adminis-
tratives de Données Sociales (DADS). They both constitute mandatory employers'
reports to the Fiscal Oﬃce. The BRN consists of ﬁrms' balance sheets and provides
important information on the employers' output, capital stock and economic sector.
The DADS contains rich data on the characteristics of the workforce. The number
of hours worked is decomposed by workers' age and occupation. The valuable in-
formation on earnings allows to measure the share of a distinct labour category in
total wage bill. However, the dataset is not without imperfection. Unfortunately,
the DADS does not contain any information on workers' education level and tenure.
In order to distinguish among workers according to the level of skills, we make
use of the available decomposition by occupation. The DADS employment data are
arranged by occupation according to the French socio-professional classiﬁcation. This
classiﬁcation is used in collective agreements for wage determination. A higher level
of education places a worker directly on the higher starting point and experience
then allows further wage increases. However, as emphasised by Thesmar and Thoenig
(2000), this classiﬁcation, based on the mix of education and experience, contains no
information about the task-assignment. Therefore, the senior personnel (Cadres)
may include high-ranked directors as well as e.g. consultants without any supervision
duty. Using this occupation classiﬁcation, we distinguish two skills categories of
workers: high-skilled and low-skilled. The high-skilled correspond to employers, the
senior and intermediate personnel. The oﬃce and sales employees as well as blue
collar workers are included in a low-skilled category. For details, see Table 1.
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Table 1: Skill classiﬁcation
High-skilled labour Low-skilled labour 
Employers
Craftsmen
Traders
Employers (of 50 or more employees) 
Liberal professions and senior personnel 
Liberal professions 
Professors and  scientific professions 
Artistic professions 
Senior administrative personnel 
Engineers and senior technicians 
Intermediate personnel 
Medical and social services 
Intermediate administrative personnel 
Technicians
Foreman, supervisors 
Non-manual workers 
Office employees 
Sales workers 
Manual workers 
Skilled industrial manual workers 
Skilled craftsman 
Drivers
Skilled handling, storage and 
transport workers 
Unskilled industrial workers 
Unskilled artisans 
As far as the labour force composition is concerned, three age classes are considered
within each skill group. We deﬁne young workers as those who are under 30 years
old, the middle-aged workers between 30 and 50, and the senior employees as those
over 50. The reason why we choose these age classes is twofold. Firstly, since we keep
only ﬁrms where all age categories are present, the condition of suﬃcient number of
observations within each age group must have been met. Secondly, the data analysis
revealed that the employment level is much more heterogenous among the young (up
to 30) and among seniors (over 50) compared to the middle-aged (30-50) group. In
particular, the lowest employment characterise the young under 25 and older persons
over 55. Nowadays, many young people decide to prolong their education and, thus,
enter relatively late into labour market. On the other hand, an earlier exit from the
labour market is still quite common among the seniors.
For the purpose of our analysis, the volume of production is represented by value
added and the employment level is measured by number of hours worked. It permits
to distinguish between part-time and full-time employees. The aberrant values have
been eliminated. Value added, capital, labour cost and employment are required to
take positive values. Only ﬁrms employing at least ﬁfty workers have been considered.
As a result of these operations, the ﬁnal dataset contains 15'992 observations.
As far as a sector division is concerned, manufacturing, trade and services are distin-
guished according to NES16 (Nomenclature économique de synthèse en 16 postes).
The agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing as well as construction sector (due to high ratio
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of seasonal workers) have been excluded from manufacturing. Administration and
ﬁnancial services have not been takes into account in services sector.
The summary statistics of the main variables as well as the labour force composition
by age and skills are represented in Table 2. We can observe substantial diﬀerences
with respect to age-employment and age-earnings patterns of workers belonging to
diﬀerent skill groups.
Employment pattern
First of all, we can see that in all three sectors, i.e. manufacturing, trade and
services, the workers between 30 and 50 years old account for around 0.6 of the
total hours worked. The employment of the young and the seniors is considerably
lower. If we look separately at each skill group, we can notice that among the high-
skilled, the number of hours worked by older workers exceeds those of the young. In
particular, the discrepancies are the biggest in manufacturing. The opposite pattern
characterises the low-skilled employees (with exception of manufacturing sector),
where the young are more numerous than the seniors.
Earnings pattern
As far as the age-earnings pattern is concerned, we observe an increasing proﬁle
of hourly earnings for both skill groups in all the sectors. The remuneration of the
young workers is the lowest and the oldest employees are paid the most. According to
economic intuition, high-skilled workers are better paid than the low-skilled. Taking
into account the desaggregation by skills, the proﬁle of hourly earnings of the low-
skilled is considerably ﬂatter - the diﬀerences between consecutive age groups are at
average of 15 % and 4 %. Interestingly, the respective mean diﬀerentials in salaries
between the high-skilled age groups are of 40 % and 30 %. Consequently, the range
of salaries in this skill category is wider.
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Table 2: Sample statistics, DADS-BRN, 2004
Variables* Manufacturing Services Trade
share mean sdv share mean sdv share mean sdv
ln value added 
ln capital 
ln capital (t-1) 
ln materials 
ln materials (t-1) 
Hours worked by age:  
total 
(Ly) young (<30) 
(Lm) middle-aged (30-50) 
(Lo) old (>50) 
1.00 
0.18 
0.60 
0.22 
-2.67 
-2.57 
-2.61 
-2.81 
-2.86 
4.85 
0.79 
2.85 
1.21 
1.15 
1.54 
1.57 
1.63 
1.63 
22.47 
4.04 
11.68 
7.09 
1.00 
0.21 
0.58 
0.21 
-3.01 
-3.32 
-3.38 
-5.54 
-5.59 
5.28 
1.09 
3.07 
1.11 
1.26 
1.85 
1.88 
2.06 
2.03 
44.68 
4.99 
24.65 
15.93 
1.00 
0.28 
0.57 
0.15 
-3.04 
-3.28 
-3.34 
-6.81 
-6.82 
3.83 
1.08 
2.19 
0.56 
1.04 
1.38 
1.39 
2.15 
2.17 
22.14 
6.74 
12.90 
2.76 
Hours worked by skills and age:  
(Ll) low-skilled 
(Lly) young 
(Llm) middle-aged 
(Llo) old 
(Lh) high-skilled 
(Lhy) young 
(Lhm) middle-aged 
(Lho) old 
0.59 
0.18 
0.58 
0.24 
0.41 
0.14 
0.59 
0.27 
2.85 
0.52 
1.65 
0.68 
2.00 
0.27 
1.19 
0.53 
13.07 
2.61 
6.65 
4.05 
10.24 
1.52 
5.65 
3.27 
0.58 
0.25 
0.56 
0.19 
0.42 
0.16 
0.61 
0.23 
3.05 
0.74 
1.72 
0.59 
2.23 
0.35 
1.36 
0.51 
18.63 
3.57 
9.64 
6.24 
26.92 
1.71 
15.59 
9.94 
0.65 
0.34 
0.53 
0.13 
0.35 
0.17 
0.65 
0.18 
2.50 
0.86 
1.32 
0.32 
1.33 
0.22 
0.87 
0.24 
17.41 
5.88 
9.70 
1.99 
5.40 
1.04 
3.65 
0.86 
* All variables have been standardised (divided by 100 000 before taking logarithms) 
Variables Manufacturing Services Trade
share mean sdv share mean sdv share mean sdv
Hourly earnings  by age: 
total 
(Ly) young (<30) 
(Lm) middle-aged (30-50) 
(Lo) old (>50) 
1.00 
0.14 
0.60 
0.26
15.66 
12.00 
15.70 
18.99 
3.93 
2.46 
3.98 
6.75 
1.00 
0.20 
0.58 
0.22 
14.65 
11.74 
14.90 
17.90 
5.84 
5.51 
8.04 
7.70 
1.00 
0.22 
0.58 
0.20 
14.36 
10.70 
14.87 
18.58 
4.42 
2.42 
4.52 
7.57 
Hourly earnings  by skills and age: 
(Ll) low-skilled 
(Lly) young 
(Llm) middle-aged 
(Llo) old 
(Lh) high-skilled 
(Lhy) young 
(Lhm) middle-aged 
(Lho) old 
0.52 
0.17 
0.60 
0.23 
0.48 
0.11 
0.59 
0.30 
12.13 
10.54 
12.35 
12.92 
22.13 
15.05 
21.73 
28.00 
2.44 
1.97 
2.53 
3.08 
4.84 
4.52 
4.86 
10.83 
0.51 
0.25 
0.56 
0.20 
0.49 
0.16 
0.58 
0.26 
11.20 
10.15 
11.46 
11.95 
19.94 
14.58 
19.88 
25.96 
2.12 
1.72 
2.39 
2.88 
6.96 
6.44 
7.14 
18.89 
0.50 
0.30 
0.55 
0.15 
0.50 
0.11 
0.62 
0.27 
10.63 
9.49 
11.03 
11.54 
20.62 
14.28 
20.36 
26.66 
1.92 
1.72 
7.49 
5.76 
5.32 
0.36 
8.54 
7.75 
Number of observations                              8185                                           4498                                           3309 
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6 Results
We start our analysis with estimation of the production function whose structure has
been detailed in Part 3. Based on the estimated parameters, we will generate and
compare the age-productivity and age-earnings pattern for the low-skilled and for
the high-skilled workers belonging to diﬀerent sectors. First, on the basis of median
values, we will present the general pattern. Afterwards, we will analyse the density
estimations of inter-ﬁrm distributions of productivity and earnings. The detailed
analysis will be carried out consecutively by skills and then by age within each skill
group.
6.1 Econometric results
Our estimation procedure consists in estimating three following models:
model (1) with labour diﬀerentiated by skills:
Y = AKα (δsLlρs + (1− δs)Lhρs)
β
ρs
model (2) with labour diﬀerentiated by age:
Y = AKα (δyLyρa + δmLmρa + (1− δy − δm)Loρa)
β
ρa
model (3) with labour diﬀerentiated simultaneously by age and skills:
Y = AKα
(
γ (δlyLlyρl + δlmLlmρl + (1− δly − δlm)Lloρl)
ρs
ρl +
+ (1− γ) (δhyLhyρh + δhmLρhhm + (1− δhy − δhm)Lρhho) ρsρh ) βρs
The estimation results for each sector of the production function are presented re-
spectively in Tables 3 to 62. The ﬁrst column refers to the results obtained according
to the nonlinear least squares method. The second column reports the production
function estimates based on the two-stages procedure by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
controlling for the potential endogeneity. Since parameters enter in the function in
a nonlinear way, estimators only have asymptotic validity. The standard errors have
been constructed according to a bootstrap approach with 200 replications.
Elasticity of substitution
2In order to check the validity and robustness of our results, in the appendix we present the
results of the estimation of diﬀerent models with sub-sector dummy variables in manufacturing
and services sectors (Tables 17 and 18). The results conﬁrm the robustness of the estimates after
introducing the sub-sector controls.
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In models with labour diﬀerentiated by skills, a inter-skill substitution parameter ρs
surprisingly has been found to converge to 1 in all the sectors (see Table 3) which
implies perfect substitutability between workers belonging to diﬀerent skill groups.
We suppose that this result might come from the classiﬁcation on low-skilled and
high-skill workers. It is possible that, in fact, there are not much diﬀerences in skill
levels for certain socio-professional categories. To circumvent this drawback, we have
run the estimation with 3 skill groups, taking apart the intermediate personnel but
it did not have much impact on the results. In the sequel, estimations are thus made
directly under the constraint ρs = 1.
Table 3: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by skills,
model (1)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
įs
ȡs
-2.197***
(0.015) 
0.187***
(0.005) 
0.829***
(0.008) 
0.231***
(0.011) 
1.257***
(0.078) 
0.301***
(0.047) 
0.729***
(0.009) 
0.207***
(0.015) 
1.327***
(0.093) 
-2.243***
(0.022) 
0.234***
(0.006) 
0.743***
(0.011) 
0.190***
(0.033) 
2.408***
(0.322)
0.173***
(0.038) 
0.699***
(0.023) 
0.163***
(0.043) 
2.649***
(0.512)
-2.421***
(0.027) 
0.118***
(0.008) 
0.903***
(0.012) 
0.216***
(0.016) 
1.336***
(0.111)
0.164***
(0.038) 
0.875***
(0.015) 
0.216***
(0.019) 
1.328***
(0.118)
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
The elasticity of substitution between workers diﬀerentiated only by age appears
quite diﬀerent by sector (see Table 4). The substitution parameter ρa is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero in services, between zero and one in manufacturing and
higher than unity in the trade sector. These results imply diﬀerent work organization
in each sector. They hold in the model with labour diﬀerentiated simultaneously by
age and skills (see Table 5). There we observe that the substitution parameter ρh
in the services sector is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. In trade, the respective
parameter for both skill groups tends to converge to 1.
19
Table 4: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age,
model (2)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
įy
įm
įo
ȡa
-1.947***
(0.022) 
0.200***
(0.005) 
0.835***
(0.008) 
0.314***
(0.018) 
0.443***
(0.026) 
0.243 
0.367***
(0.074) 
0.278***
(0.038) 
0.726***
(0.010) 
0.281***
(0.020) 
0.491***
(0.032) 
0.228***
(0.017) 
0.246***
(0.094) 
-2.067***
(0.036) 
0.240***
(0.006) 
0.735***
(0.011) 
0.221***
(0.027) 
0.479***
(0.057) 
0.300 
1.321***
(0.314) 
0.186***
(0.037) 
0.691***
(0.021) 
0.238***
(0.036) 
0.540***
(0.084) 
0.222**
(0.094) 
0.955 
(1.482) 
-2.287***
(0.039) 
0.104***
(0.008) 
0.921***
(0.013) 
0.070***
(0.019) 
0.326***
(0.064) 
0.604 
1.912***
(0.340) 
0.159***
(0.038) 
0.879***
(0.016) 
0.074***
(0.017) 
0.357***
(0.072) 
0.569***
(0.074) 
1.848***
(0.366) 
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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Table 5: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age
and skills, model (3)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
Ȗ
1-Ȗ
įly
įlm
įlo
ȡl
įhy
įhm
įho
ȡh
-1.294***
(0.021) 
0.186***
(0.004) 
0.833***
(0.007) 
0.274***
(0.013) 
0.725 
0.437***
(0.034) 
0.417***
(0.046) 
0.145 
0.463***
(0.119) 
0.247***
(0.029) 
0.405***
(0.036) 
0.347 
0.725***
(0.122) 
0.291***
(0.045) 
0.736***
(0.009) 
0.254***
(0.015) 
0.746***
(0.015) 
0.395***
(0.032) 
0.458***
(0.052) 
0.147***
(0.030) 
0.372***
(0.120) 
0.242***
(0.031) 
0.432***
(0.042) 
0.326***
(0.026) 
0.594***
(0.132) 
-1.538***
(0.037) 
0.222***
(0.006) 
0.759***
(0.011) 
0.367***
(0.027) 
0.633 
0.275***
(0.036) 
0.497***
(0.075) 
0.227 
0.810***
(0.286) 
0.117**
(0.061) 
0.372***
(0.103) 
0.511 
2.302***
(0.820) 
0.166***
(0.040) 
0.717***
(0.022) 
0.357***
(0.023) 
0.643***
(0.023) 
0.282***
(0.030) 
0.558***
(0.068) 
0.159**
(0.065) 
0.574***
(0.186) 
0.134 
(0.099) 
0.388**
(0.181) 
0.477*
(0.268) 
2.065 
(10.898) 
-1.538***
(0.036) 
0.112***
(0.008) 
0.911***
(0.012) 
0.226***
(0.021) 
0.774 
0.236***
(0.042) 
0.608***
(0.099) 
0.155 
1.341***
(0.427) 
0.209***
(0.032) 
0.421***
(0.049) 
0.370 
0.789***
(0.169) 
0.159***
(0.036) 
0.879***
(0.015) 
0.215***
(0.026) 
0.785***
(0.026) 
0.263***
(0.046) 
0.673***
(0.124) 
0.063 
(0.121) 
1.039**
(0.518) 
0.192***
(0.058) 
0.427***
(0.091) 
0.380***
(0.054) 
0.792**
(0.324) 
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
The results shown in Table 6 include already all these constraints on parameters
ρl and ρh. We observe that low-skilled services workers of diﬀerent age are closer
substitutes than the high-skilled ones. Interestingly, in manufacturing, the high-
skilled workers have been found more easily substitutable between each other than
the low-skilled.
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Table 6: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age
and skills, constrained model (3)
Parameters Manufacturing Services Trade
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
c
Į
ȕ
Ȗ
1-Ȗ
įly
įlm
įlo
ȡl
įhy
įhm
įho
ȡh
-1.294***
(0.021) 
0.186***
(0.004) 
0.833***
(0.007) 
0.274***
(0.013) 
0.725 
0.437***
(0.034) 
0.417***
(0.046) 
0.145 
0.463***
(0.119) 
0.247***
(0.029) 
0.405***
(0.036) 
0.347 
0.725***
(0.122) 
0.291***
(0.045) 
0.736***
(0.009) 
0.254***
(0.015) 
0.746***
(0.015) 
0.395***
(0.032) 
0.458***
(0.052) 
0.147***
(0.030) 
0.372***
(0.120) 
0.242***
(0.031) 
0.432***
(0.042) 
0.326***
(0.026) 
0.594***
(0.132) 
-1.587***
(0.035) 
0.222***
(0.006) 
0.751***
(0.011) 
0.405***
(0.027) 
0.595 
0.252***
(0.038) 
0.430***
(0.071) 
0.318 
1.062***
(0.324) 
0.081**
(0.028) 
0.832***
(0.045) 
0.085 
0
0.165***
(0.040) 
0.709***
(0.022) 
0.387***
(0.024) 
0.612***
(0.024) 
0.263**
(0.030) 
0.505 
(0.074) 
0.231**
(0.079) 
0.778***
(0.230) 
0.110 
(0.034) 
0.802**
(0.052) 
0.087*
(0.034) 
0
-1.534***
(0.035) 
0.113***
(0.008) 
0.910***
(0.012) 
0.218***
(0.019) 
0.782 
0.240***
(0.037) 
0.668***
(0.085) 
0.092 
1
0.222***
(0.032) 
0.373***
(0.029) 
0.404 
1
0.159***
(0.036) 
0.878***
(0.015) 
0.213***
(0.022) 
0.786***
(0.022) 
0.262***
(0.037) 
0.680***
(0.085) 
0.058 
(0.091) 
1
0.201***
(0.056) 
0.385***
(0.038) 
0.414***
(0.039) 
1
elasticity of substitution : ı=1/(1-ȡ)
Lly-Llm-Llo
Lhy-Lhm-Lho 
1.59 
3.64 
4.5 
1
ĺ
ĺ
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
Control for endogenity bias
The nonlinear least squares estimates appear to suﬀer from the endogeneity bias
implying existing correlation between productivity and input choices. Interestingly,
the existing bias has diﬀerent character in distinct sectors. In manufacturing and
in trade, the NLLS method tends to underestimate the capital coeﬃcient (α) and
overestimate the labour coeﬃcients (β). Such situation takes place if capital and
labour are positively correlated and labour's correlation with the productivity shock
is higher than capital's correlation. On the other hand, in services, both NLLS coeﬃ-
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cients α and β tend to be biased up. It might be the case when only labour responds
to the shock and at the same time capital and labour are positively correlated3.
We can also observe interesting results regarding the potential endogeneity bias
within the labour input. In the model with labour diﬀerentiated by skills (model (1)
and (3)), we see the coeﬃcients of low-skilled workers to be slightly biased up in all
the sectors. Among diﬀerent age categories, the coeﬃcients of old workers (as well
as young workers in manufacturing) are overestimated. Although these biases are
not statistically signiﬁcant, they might however indicate that the correlation of these
categories of labour with the productivity shock is higher. It could imply that more
of this labour type is hired/made redundant in response to the positive/negative
productivity shock.
Within the labour diﬀerentiated simultaneously by age and skills, in all the sectors,
the NLLS estimates tend to underestimate the middle-aged workers coeﬃcient. For
other skill-age categories, the results are more sector-speciﬁc. Among the under-
estimated coeﬃcients suggesting lower correlation with the productivity shock, we
ﬁnd: young low-skilled workers in services and trade, old low-skilled workers in man-
ufacturing, young high-skilled workers in services and senior high-skilled workers in
trade. Nevertheless, these biases stay not very signiﬁcant.
6.2 Age-productivity and age-earnings proﬁle: general pattern
According to the methodology presented in part 3, we construct the productivity
contributions and wage shares for diﬀerent categories of workers. Thanks to the
information on earnings in the dataset, the share of a distinct age group in the
wage bill of a given skill category may be easily computed. Based on the estimated
parameters values corrected for the endogeneity bias (right columns of Table 6),
we address the question of the marginal product of labour. Consequently, we can
compare an earnings-productivity pattern for diﬀerent skill and age categories of
workers in three diﬀerent sectors.
A general tendency regarding productivity contributions and wage shares is presented
in Table 7 and is given by the median. In our case, where the data are not necessarily
symmetrically distributed, the median is a form of average that gives a better idea
of a general pattern than given by the mean. In fact, if data are symmetrically
distributed, using either the mean or the median gives almost identical results. In
case of skewed distributions, using the mean could be misleading as means are very
sensitive to outliers.
3According to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), these two cases might be the most relevant for short
panels because between-ﬁrm variation often plays a dominant role in identiﬁcation and, in this
dimension, capital and labour tend to be highly correlated.
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Table 7: Age-productivity and age-earnings pattern
Manufacturing
Services
Trade
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Assuming that there exists an average enterprise, we observe throughout the sectors
and for both skill categories of workers that wage shares vary substantially less
than workers' productivity. In manufacturing, the age-productivity and age-earnings
proﬁles are compatible with a deferred compensation system. It might indicate
that, in this sector, the eﬀort incentive problem has been regulated in practice by
many ﬁrms by oﬀering at the start of the career wages under the workers' marginal
productivity and compensating this diﬀerence in the later periods. On the other
hand, in services and in trade, we observe the combined relevance of speciﬁc human
capital and deferred compensation. For young employees, the productivity proﬁle is
steeper than the wage proﬁle suggesting that investments in speciﬁc human capital
are important at the beginning of employees' careers. For older workers, the wage
share is higher than productivity contribution implying rather an incentive based
compensation scheme.
Interestingly, for the high-skilled workers in manufacturing, there is not much diﬀer-
ence in productivity across the age groups. Though, it is the highest for the oldest
employees. In trade, the productivity has a clearly increasing slope. Importantly,
in both of these sectors, the proﬁle of wage share of middle-aged and senior workers
does not diverge much from the proﬁle of productivity contribution.
At the same time, in the low-skilled category, the estimated workers' productivity
is clearly the lowest for the oldest workers. It is possible that certain low-skilled
employees, as time is passing, either quit the labour market (e.g. due to early
retirement) or upgrade their qualiﬁcations and move to the high-skilled occupations.
Thus, the senior workers who stay in the low-skilled jobs are those who are not
very productive. The similar phenomenon could be also observed among the people
in high-skilled occupations. Seniors working as highly-skilled experts are not an
exception in certain jobs. Hence, the seniors who are still working tend to be those
relatively more productive. In order to control for this selection phenomenon, time
series on labour turnover would be needed.
6.3 Density estimations
The results for the average enterprise are interesting but do not reﬂect all the
complexity of variation in wage shares and productivity contributions across the
enterprises. Therefore, we also analyse the shape of the density functions of wage and
productivity distributions. In this purpose, we make use of kernel density estimation
which is a non-parametric way of estimating the probability density function. It
is clearly smoother than some other density estimators such as histogram. The
univariate kernel density estimator is computed using:
fˆ(x) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K
[
x−Xi
h
]
(23)
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where K is the Epanechnikov Kernel function and h is a smoothing parameter called
the bandwith (Parzen, 1962).
6.3.1 Productivity
The productivity contribution (MPij/MPiav) is deﬁned as a ratio of marginal prod-
uct of a speciﬁc age group (j) over the average labour marginal product of a given
skill group (i). If the productivity of a certain age group equals to the sector average,
this ratio equals to 1. In Tables 8 - 10, this case is expressed as a black vertical line.
Since the distribution of productivity across the age groups is highly sector-speciﬁc,
we analyse each sector separately as follows.
Manufacturing
In manufacturing, as shown in Table 8, the productivity of low-skilled workers across
the enterprises is characterised by higher variability than the one of high-skilled
workers. In general, the median absolute deviations are higher and there are more
positive outliers. If we look closer at diﬀerent age groups, we can notice that in both
skills groups a greater variability in productivity is observed among young and older
workers. At the same time, the productivity contribution of the middle-aged group
does not vary that much between the ﬁrms. Its values are well concentrated around
the sector average.
Certain particularities can be observed within each skills category. Among the low-
skilled, the young workers appear the most productive. Most of them have produc-
tivity contribution exceeding the sector average (>1) and we observe many positive
outliers. On the other hand, the great majority of older workers have productivity
below the average (<1). Though a few positive outliers occur.
The density estimations concerning the high-skilled workers are quite diﬀerent. The
productivity distributions of diﬀerent age groups have much more symmetric shape
and the median value is quite close to the sector average. In this skill category, the
older workers appear the most productive group. More than half of them are more
productive than an average high-skilled person.
Services
Table 9 reveals a pattern of productivity distribution in the sector of services. This
time, a higher inter-ﬁrm variability can be observed for the high-skilled employees.
Both, the median absolute deviations as well as positive outliers take much higher
values for this type of workers.
Nevertheless, this time the productivity proﬁle across the age groups is similar in
both skill groups. The middle-aged workers are found clearly the most productive.
26
Table 8: Share in average marginal productivity (manufacturing)
Almost all of them reach productivity higher than sector average ( > 1). In contrast,
most of juniors and seniors are characterised by the productivity below the mean.
However, there are some positive outliers, especially among the high-skilled workers.
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Table 9: Share in average marginal productivity (services)
Trade
As can be seen in Table 10, in trade the productivity pattern is very diﬀerent from
those observed in other sectors. First of all, the productivity variability within
narrowly deﬁned age groups is much lower. Furthermore, there are large diﬀerences
between skill groups. Among the low-skilled workers, the productivity distributions
almost do not cross each other. The middle-aged workers are the most productive
with the productivity contribution over the sector average in all the enterprises. The
productivity of young and seniors is considerably lower, well below the sector mean.
A very diﬀerent situation takes place within the high-skilled category of workers.
Here, the senior are the most productive group followed closely by middle-aged work-
ers with very similar productivity distribution. The young high-skilled employees are
signiﬁcantly less productive.
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Table 10: Share in average marginal productivity (trade)
6.3.2 Earnings
The distributions of wages over age and skill categories are presented in Tables 11,
12 and 13. The wage share (Wij/Wiav) is deﬁned as a ratio of earnings of a speciﬁc
age group (j) over the average earnings of a given skill group (i). The ratio equals
to 1 (expressed in the tables by a black vertical line) if earnings correspond to the
sector average.
In all the sectors we observe a very similar pattern. In general, wage rates vary
substantially less than workers' productivity. It is in line with empirical evidence
against the paradigm of wage and marginal productivity equality (Frank (1984),
Campbell and Kamlani (1997)). As far as diﬀerentiation by skills is concerned,
wages of low-skilled workers are less variable than those of the high-skilled.
In the low-skilled category, the middle-aged group of workers is characterised by the
earnings distribution with the lowest variability, well concentrated around the mean.
The earnings variability of young and older workers is very comparable.
Within the high-skilled group we observe more positive outliers, in particular for
senior workers, possibly due to better remuneration oﬀered to high-skilled employees
with a long tenure. The distribution of earnings for the middle-aged workers is the
least variable, followed by young and senior employees.
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Table 11: Share in average wage (manufacturing)
Table 12: Share in average wage (services)
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Table 13: Share in average wage (trade)
6.3.3 Productivity/earnings ratio
The most interesting aspect from the perspective of the employer is the workers'
productivity in relation to their cost. It is particularly important as for the employers
it may present an incentive to exclude some age groups from the labour market and
to give preference to the others.
It is possible that some workers having the same productivity are paid diﬀerently or
that some other are paid equally but have diﬀerent productivities. Therefore, apart
of analysing the productivity distribution separately from wages, we consider also
the inter-ﬁrm distribution of the productivity/earnings ratio with respect to all age
and skill groups (see Tables 14, 15 and 16). We deﬁne it as MPijMPiav/
Wij
Wiav
.
It appears that in manufacturing the relative productivity over the wage ratio is
the highest for the young, followed by the middle-aged and the old. The possible
explanation could be that the young are paid the least and at the same time they
are highly motivated to work hard. If there exists incomplete information about the
workers' ability at the beginning of their career, the young workers might exert much
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more eﬀort in order to suggest high ability level and keep their current job (Grund
and Westergård-Nielsen, 2005). The high variability in distribution for the young
comes from the positive outliers.
This productivity/earnings ratio decreases with age for both skill groups. It means
that the attractiveness of an employee for the employer decreases with age. Though,
it is not so strong for the high-skilled workers. The distribution of the ratio shows
higher variability for the older compared to the middle-aged workers. It has a lower
median and a signiﬁcant majority of observations are below the sector average.
Table 14: Ratio of relative productivity over relative wage (manufacturing)
In services sector, we observe lower variability of the ratio among the low-skilled
workers. The high variability for the high-skilled comes, among others, from the
positive outliers in this group. In both skill categories, the productivity/earnings
ratio is the highest for the middle-aged, followed by young and senior workers. Thus,
similarly to the pure productivity proﬁle, the middle-aged workers are the most
attractive employees. However, the biggest positive outliers are found among the
junior workers.
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Table 15: Ratio of relative productivity over relative wage (services)
Contrasting results are found in the trade sector as shown in Table 16. For the
low-skilled employees, the productivity/earnings ratio is very dispersed across the
age groups. Likewise in services, the middle-aged workers are the most attractive,
followed by juniors and seniors. Among the high-skilled, for all the age groups the
distribution of the ratio converge closely around the mean and does not vary much.
Again, the prime-age workers constitute the group whose majority has the ratio of
productivity over cost higher than the sector average. They are followed by the older
workers, whose distribution is well symmetric around the mean.
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Table 16: Ratio of relative productivity over relative wage (trade)
7 Conclusions
This paper revisits the question of the actual proﬁle of marginal productivity across
the age groups within the given workforce and its potential equality with proﬁle
of earnings. Using the French ﬁrm-level data, we estimated the parameters of the
production function where the labour input, diﬀerentiated simultaneously by age
and skills, takes a nested CES functional form. We controlled for the endogeneity
bias according to the methodology by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Among the main ﬁndings, workers of diﬀerent age appear to be imperfect substitutes
in production. The elasticity of substitution for workers of diﬀerent age has been
found considerably lower than implied by the additive functional form speciﬁcation.
Our results suggest that wages do not necessarily reﬂect the actual productivity.
Consistent with study by Frank (1984) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997), the wage
proﬁle has been found less variable than productivity.
As far as the labour productivity is concerned, its proﬁle across distinct age groups
is likely to depend on the skill category. It has been found the lowest for the low-
skilled older workers. Senior high-skilled employees in manufacturing and trade are
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the most productive group. The results for manufacturing sector show that the age-
productivity and age-earnings proﬁles are compatible with a deferred compensation
system. It might indicate that the eﬀort incentive problem has been regulated in
practice by many ﬁrms by oﬀering at the start of the career wages under the workers'
marginal productivity and compensating this diﬀerence in the later periods. On the
other hand, in services and in trade, we observe the combined relevance of speciﬁc
human capital and deferred compensation.
Relative productivity over wage ratio, an important aspect for the employer, has
been found sector-speciﬁc. In manufacturing, it is the highest for the young work-
ers. In services and trade, the ratio is the highest for the middle-aged employees.
This discrepancy between productivity and earnings can be a source of employment
diﬃculties particularly for the older low-skilled workers.
8 Appendix
Table 17: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age,
sub-sector controls
Parameters Manufacturing Services
NLLS LP NLLS LP
Į
ȕ
įy
įm
įo
ȡa
sub-sector 
controls 
0.222 
(0.005)*** 
0.811 
(0.008)*** 
0.325 
(0.019)*** 
0.450 
(0.027)*** 
0.224 
0.345 
(0.075)*** 
yes
0.284 
(0.029)*** 
0.679 
(0.010)*** 
0.293 
(0.023)*** 
0.508 
(0.035)*** 
0.198 
(0.017)*** 
0.188 
(0.099)* 
yes
0.241 
(0.006)*** 
0.710 
(0.011)*** 
0.275 
(0.026)*** 
0.427 
(0.048)*** 
0.298 
0.935 
(0.213)*** 
yes
0.189 
(0.039)*** 
0.642 
(0.024)*** 
0.299 
(0.030)*** 
0.425 
(0.051)*** 
0.276 
(0.051)*** 
0.759 
(0.176)*** 
yes
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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Table 18: Production function estimates for each sector, labour diﬀerentiated by age
and skills, sub-sector controls
Parameters Manufacturing Services
no constraints no constraints ȡh=0
NLLS LP NLLS LP NLLS LP
Į
ȕ
Ȗ
1-Ȗ
įly
įlm
įlo
ȡl
įhy
įhm
įho
ȡh
sub-sector 
controls 
0.191 
(0.005)*** 
0.827 
(0.008)*** 
0.279 
(0.013)*** 
0.721 
0.441 
(0.033)*** 
0.420 
(0.046)*** 
0.138 
0.437 
(0.117)*** 
0.248 
(0.029)*** 
0.403 
(0.037)*** 
0.348 
0.726 
(0.124)*** 
yes
0.283 
(0.041)*** 
0.714 
(0.009)*** 
0.269 
(0.016)*** 
0.730 
(0.016)*** 
0.404 
(0.033)*** 
0.465 
(0.052)*** 
0.131 
(0.029)*** 
0.323 
(0.118)*** 
0.246 
(0.032)*** 
0.435 
(0.044)*** 
0.318 
(0.027)*** 
0.581 
(0.138)*** 
yes
0.218 
(0.006)*** 
0.733 
(0.011)*** 
0.331 
(0.025)*** 
0.669 
0.342 
(0.038)*** 
0.435 
(0.071)*** 
0.222 
0.653 
(0.234)*** 
0.211 
(0.041)*** 
0.391 
(0.067)*** 
0.398 
1.009 
(0.288)*** 
yes
0.167 
(0.042)*** 
0.668 
(0.025)*** 
0.324 
(0.023)*** 
0.675 
(0.023)*** 
0.371 
(0.034)*** 
0.451 
(0.062)*** 
0.177 
(0.055)*** 
0.473 
(0.160)*** 
0.214 
(0.067)*** 
0.361 
(0.091)*** 
0.424 
(0.132)*** 
0.984 
(3.484) 
yes
0.219 
(0.006)*** 
0.724 
(0.011)*** 
0.364 
(0.026)*** 
0.635 
0.334 
(0.038)*** 
0.387 
(0.066)*** 
0.278 
0.814 
(0.248)*** 
0.132 
(0.028)*** 
0.696 
(0.045)*** 
0.172 
0
yes
0.167 
(0.042)*** 
0.660 
(0.025)*** 
0.356 
(0.026)*** 
0.643 
(0.026)*** 
0.365 
(0.034)*** 
0.409 
(0.062)*** 
0.226 
(0.060)*** 
0.608 
(0.172)*** 
0.144 
(0.035)*** 
0.664 
(0.054)*** 
0.191 
(0.037)*** 
0
yes
No of obs. 8185 8185 4498 4498 3309 3309 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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